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Editorial: Unpredictability, Contingency and 
Counterfactuals 
Roland Wenzlhuemer ∗ 
Abstract: »Unvorhersehbarkeit, Kontingenz und das Kontrafaktische«. While 
it has always been present in our everyday-life practices, counterfactual 
thinking currently stages a comeback as a scientific method. Of late, a renewed 
interest in counterfactuals can be witnessed in academic disciplines that have 
traditionally been suspicious of studying events or processes that have never 
happened (and will never happen). Is it mere coincidence that an impressive 
number of unconnected initiatives have started to re-discuss counterfactual 
thinking at the same time? Or are we living through times that somehow foster 
such a renewed interest in unpredictability, contingency and counterfactuals? 
Keywords: contingency, counterfactual thinking. 
 
Ours are unstable times. While historians will rightly hold that in the past 
we easily find any number of periods of unpredictability and instability, this 
does not alter the current prevalence of a general feeling of insecurity as to 
what the future might hold. At the time of writing in February 2009 the 
industrialized countries are experiencing (the early phase of) an economic 
depression unheard of for almost a century. Mistrust in the financial and 
economic system has reached a level that questions the very foundations of this 
system – which has been build on credit and, therefore, on trust. Very early in 
the crisis, observers have already heralded the end of capitalism as we know it. 
Should such prognoses come true this would mean nothing else but the collapse 
of the second allegedly infallible economic (and ideological) world order 
within twenty years – leaving the populace to a largely unpredictable future. 
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in New York City, London and Madrid 
together with the prevailing chaos in Afghanistan and Iraq have been 
challenging established global power relations since the turn of the new 
millennium. The nation state, it seems, has reached the limits of its power and 
lacks the means to successfully confront terrorism and piracy (for instance 
around the horn of Africa). At the same time, representatives of nation states 
have frequently transgressed hitherto inviolable borders while trying to keep 
the upper hand. Democratic ideals and human rights have been spurned over 
and over again. Thereby, established value systems have been called into 
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question and moral compasses disturbed. On top of this, rarely a day goes by 
without new alarming data on the speed and potential consequences of global 
warming – which, in essence, questions the future of mankind as we know it. 
Therefore, ours are unstable times, indeed. No doubt about it. Prognoses as 
to the future of the nation state, the capitalist system or the global climate are 
hard to make. Just as many former real estate owners, blue collar workers and 
bank employees find it hard to make any predictions regarding their own 
future. The certainties of previous decades are things of the past. Hardly 
anything seems predetermined anymore. And exactly in these unstable times, 
there seems to be renewed interest in a field that has existed at the very 
periphery of academic investigation for decades – counterfactual thinking. 
While present in many different disciplines and forms of research, this 
particular style of enquiry has mainly been discussed in the historical sciences 
as counterfactual, virtual or alternate history. In the 1960s and 1970s, forays 
into the field have mostly been unsystematic and without any theoretical 
backing. Criticism from “factual” colleagues in the discipline has, however, 
been all the more outspoken. The condemning comments of both E. H. Carr 
and E. P. Thompson are well-known and still summarize much of the 
traditional reservations against counterfactual history. 
Only in the 1980s, a German historian, Alexander Demandt, finally made a 
powerful argument in favour of counterfactual thinking in history. In his book 
Ungeschehene Geschichte, Demandt did not only make the case for 
counterfactual reasoning, he also took up the other side’s most powerful 
arguments and replied in a thoughtful but convincing way. To me, his thin 
treatise is still the best discussion of counterfactuals and their potential 
usefulness in historical enquiry that we have to date. Although widely read, 
Ungeschehene Geschichte did not trigger a substantial discussion of the issue. 
Only in the mid-1990s another well-known historian took up the cause and 
published an edited volume with an insightful introduction written by himself. 
Niall Ferguson’s Virtual History roused more interest – probably due both to 
the author’s growing reputation in Anglo-American academia as well as to the 
“juicier” case studies that the contributing authors discussed. While many of 
the contributions to Virtual History were well-researched and methodologically 
sound, the book triggered a wave of less academic publications in the field that 
tried to appeal to a wider readership. To critics of counterfactual enquiry, these 
volumes simply proved what was wrong with the approach. Many case studies 
were far-fetched, selected more on grounds of their dramatic promises than 
their historical relevance. Conclusions remained speculative. No traces of a 
sound methodology or structured historical enquiry could be found. Quod erat 
demonstrandum. 
In the field of history, not much of substance has been published on 
counterfactual thinking since Ferguson’s volume. But today, all of a sudden, 
we see a renewed interest in all things counterfactual. Together with the 
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philosopher Rayk Meckel, the author gave an interdisciplinary seminar on 
counterfactual thinking at the University of Lucerne in the summer term of 
2007. The seminar attracted a diverse but very dedicated crowd of students and 
– somewhat to the surprise of the lecturers – seemed to strike a long neglected 
chord. Motivated by the students’ positive feedback, we decided to try and 
bring together “counterfactualists” from different fields and countries at a 
workshop to be held at Humboldt-University in Berlin in September 2008. 
While we initially doubted that we would be able to mobilize a critical mass of 
attendees and contributors, we were surprised at the amount and quality of the 
feedback. Most contributors to this volume have attended the workshop, 
presented a paper and participated in the discussions. Therefore, the content of 
this special issue closely mirrors the structure of the workshop and reflects the 
key topics and results of our discussions. It is also the product of the attendees’ 
shared belief that a keen exchange between the different disciplines about the 
practical application of counterfactuals is essential, if the analytical potential of 
counterfactual thinking should be illustrated. The workshop has been a first 
attempt at collecting, juxtaposing, comparing and then eventually merging the 
very diverse definitions of counterfactuals or counterfactuality that are 
employed in the different disciplines. The contributions in this volume build on 
the workshop presentations but also consider and integrate the discussions held 
and the common ground identified at the workshop. 
While putting together the workshop and contacting potential attendees, we 
learned of a host of similar initiatives and interest groups. In October 2007, 
graduate students organized a conference on Goofy History discussing all sorts 
of unusual interpretations of the past – among them counterfactual histories. 
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung published a Folio special issue on “Was wäre, 
wenn…” in which writers, essayists and other public persons presented their 
very own “might-have-been” or “could-have-been” scenarios. At the newly 
established FRIAS School of Language & Literature at the University of 
Freiburg, an interdisciplinary workshop on counterfactual thinking to be hosted 
later this year is currently being organized. This gathering will broach the issue 
mainly from a literature and culture perspective. Eventually, days before our 
own workshop took place, we learned that at the University of Konstanz, a 
research focus on counterfactuality had just been granted and was soon to be 
implemented.  
So, after all these years of neglect and peripheral existence, where does all 
this renewed interest in counterfactual questions come from? Is there, indeed, 
some connection to the real and the perceived instability of our times? While I 
clearly see the danger of overestimating the power and appeal of counter-
factuals, I would very much like to think that there is some connection. When 
future developments seem largely unpredictable and highly contingent, the 
degree of predetermination and unavoidability of the course of history must be 
freshly assessed as well. Both communism as well as capitalism (for a long 
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time the opposites in a bipolar but reasonably stable/predictable world order) 
have traditionally been styled as the products of a largely preprogrammed 
process of evolution that could not but culminate either in communism or in 
capitalism respectively. The former has, from its very inception, been based on 
the Marxist version of historical determinism – the belief that history would 
inevitably lead to the idealized rule of the proletariat. In the case of the latter, 
the determinism was of a subtler breed. But publications such as Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History or the constant repetition of the formula 
“There Is No Alternative” clearly illustrate the deterministic element in 
capitalist self-reflection. But what now? As an economic system, communism 
has utterly collapsed. And while its fate is not entirely clear, it seems that 
capitalism as we know it might follow suit. Not only has the perceived stability 
of a bipolar world order long since come to an end – both economic systems 
(cum ideology) have failed despite their self-styled terminal position in the 
evolution. Predetermination, it seems, only goes so far. Is history, after all, 
more contingent than we liked to believe? And might it, therefore, be more 
relevant and illuminating to think about potential alternative historical courses 
than we previously thought? I would very much like to think so but can, of 
course, offer no substantial proof for the connection between our unstable times 
and the renewed interest in counterfactual thinking. 
It seems perfectly clear, however, that the work that psychologists have 
done on counterfactual thinking since the early 1990s has paved the way for the 
current revival of the issue in other disciplines. Researchers such as 
Tycocinski, Markman or Roese have successfully shown in hundreds of 
experimental studies that counterfactual thinking in everyday-life situations can 
– under certain circumstances – be extremely useful for the thinker. After all, 
there seems to be some use crying over spilt beans (or milk) – at least if the 
crying is followed by some serious thinking about possible but unrealized 
alternatives. Largely without knowing and certainly without intending to, these 
psychologist have provided a powerful argument supporting the analytical 
usefulness of counterfactuals and thereby countering the standard charge of 
many critics in history and other disciplines. It has been one of the goals of our 
workshop and of this volume to build on such psychological research and to 
show how the same or very similar analytical mechanisms can be employed in 
an academic context. 
This volume, therefore, opens with a contribution by the American 
psychologists Neal Roese and Mike Morrison on “The Psychology of 
Counterfactual Thinking”. The authors show how and in which situations we 
think counterfactually and which benefits can come from the practice. The 
article illustrates how counterfactual thinking can highlight causal relations 
(causal inference effect) or invoke contrasting scenarios (contrast effect). My 
own text on “Counterfactual Thinking as a Scientific Method” tries to follow 
up on this. It recapitulates how exactly such effects work in everyday-life 
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situations and then seeks to translate them into an academic context. First, I do 
so from a general, interdisciplinary viewpoint. Later in the text I focus 
particularly on the usefulness of counterfactual thinking in the field of history. 
Towards the end, I also try to offer some words of caution when I highlight the 
potential pitfalls associated with historical counterfactuals. Again, most of 
these have a counterpart in everyday-life counterfactuals as well. 
Together with this editorial these two contributions form the introductory 
part of the special issue and seek to build a bridge between counterfactual 
thinking in everyday life, its potential uses in academic research in general and 
its application in history in particular. The following three texts are mainly 
concerned with counterfactual history, its status within the discipline and its 
potential uses. Working at the interface between history and political science, 
Richard Lebow uses “counterfactuals to probe the limits of theory and to 
develop better means of understanding causation in a largely open-ended, non-
linear highly contingent world.” In his contribution “Counterfactuals, History 
and Fiction” he, however, also refers to recent experiments that have shown 
how a protagonist’s beliefs and world view influence his/her attitude towards 
or choice of counterfactuals in history. In doing so, Lebow highlights how 
personal biases can produce different counterfactual alternatives and, thereby, 
different interpretations of the past. In a similar vein, Georg Schmid in 
“Counterfactuals and Futures Histories; Retrospective Imagining as an 
Auxiliary for the Scenarios of Expectance” illustrates how our expectations 
influence the nature of our counterfactuals. Schmid aptly puts forward that 
many different pasts compete with one allegedly correct or real past for 
Interpretationshoheit (the monopoly of interpretation) of history. While 
concerned mainly with historical counterfactuals, the contribution also 
manages to connect past, present and future counterfactuals via the “scenarios 
of expectance”. Ann Talbot’s article on “Chance and Necessity in History: E.H 
Carr and Leon Trotsky Compared” links up with Lebow’s experiments and 
shows how attitudes towards historical counterfactuals depend on someone’s 
general beliefs about the laws (if any) of history. Talbot uses the British 
historian E. H. Carr – an outspoken critic of counterfactual methods in 
historical research – as an example to show that a belief in historical 
determinism and an evolutionary course of history makes the serious 
contemplation of counterfactual alternatives very difficult. To further illustrate 
this point, the author contrasts Carr’s views with those of Isaiah Berlin and 
Leon Trotsky. 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young leads over from the counterfactual history part of 
the special issue to the third section that explores how counterfactual thinking 
is – often as a matter of course – employed in disciplines or professions other 
than history. His article “Fallacies and Thresholds: Notes on the Early 
Evolution of Alternate History” reconstructs the founding decade of the 
Science Fiction subgenre Alternate History and traces the uses and functions 
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that counterfactuals can have in a literary context. Helmut Weber then takes the 
reader into the allegedly dry and strictly fact-based realm of the law. In “The 
‘But For’ Test and Other Devices –The Role of Hypothetical Events in the 
Law” he shows that many areas of modern jurisdiction are based on 
counterfactual enquiry which is a valid and, in fact, the only suitable means to 
re-construct an alternative reality against which a case’s reality has to be 
measured. The contributions of Jens Ennen and Ekaterina Svetlova then take us 
into the field of evaluation and forecasting in economics – another discipline in 
which counterfactuals are employed on a regular and rarely contested basis. In 
“The Evaluation of Welfare State Performance: Modelling a Counterfactual 
World” Ennen exemplifies how welfare state evaluation depends on 
counterfactual reasoning. In order to assess both their effectiveness and 
efficiency, welfare state reforms need to be tested against an unrealized 
alternative that can only be invoked with the help of counterfactuals. In 
Svetlova’s contribution “‘Do I See What the Market Does Not See?’: 
Counterfactual Thinking in Financial Markets”, portfolio managers resort to 
similar methods in order to perform better than the market in average. Apart 
from a worthwhile glimpse into the working environment of portfolio 
managers, Ekaterina Svetlova also offers a new and broader definition of 
counterfactual thinking that makes the term fit for explorations into the future. 
The fourth and final section of the special issue brings us back to 
counterfactual history. It offers four specific historical case studies that employ 
counterfactual thinking as a method of enquiry. The section opens with Juliane 
Schiel’s article “Crossing Paths between East and West. The Use of 
Counterfactual Thinking for the Concept of ‘Entangled History’”. Schiel aptly 
illustrates how counterfactuals can be particularly useful when trying to 
disentangle “entangled histories” – a field of history that emphasizes the 
mutual connections between seemingly unrelated or distant regions, 
protagonists or even time periods. “Entangled history” does not lend itself to 
deterministic interpretations of the past and rather enforces a chaotic view of 
history. By using the early encounters between Mongols and Mendicants as an 
example, Juliane Schiel shows that counterfactual thinking can help us to make 
such chaotic and “entangled histories” somewhat easier to handle. Elke 
Ohnacker stresses how much care must be devoted to selecting the right 
counterfactual questions in historical enquiry – counterfactuals that seemed 
possible, plausible or even probable at the time. In her case study “What If... 
Charlemagne’s Other Sons had Survived? Charlemagne’s Sons and the 
Problems of Royal Succession” she uses established knowledge about 
Charlemagne’s time to ask new, counterfactual questions. Thereby, she 
demonstrates that good counterfactuals are never completely speculative but 
rather build on known material and practices which they expand and re-
interpret. In a similar vein, Sören Philipps re-interprets a much more current 
event with the help of counterfactuals. In “The birth of the European Union: 
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Challenging the myth of the civilian power narrative” he picks a very probably 
point of bifurcation and explores what could have happened, had the European 
Defence Community been founded in 1954. Following Georg Schmid’s earlier 
lament about the inaccuracy of many metaphors used to describe alternative 
pasts and possible courses of history, Philipps suggests a new and somewhat 
less rigid metaphor – the cloud. Eventually, Tobias Winnerling sets out to 
explore “Invented Formosa, the Empire of the Great Khan and Lilliput: Can 
18th century fiction be counterfactual?” Winnerling radically redefines the 
term counterfactuals and, thereby, questions the established way of thinking 
about counterfactuals. He proposes a new use for old travelogues and 
descriptions of the foreign that, from today’s point of view, cannot be 
considered sources of factual information anymore. Might they be usable as 
counterparts to empirical scenarios in historical comparisons, provided they can 
be qualified as counterfactual? 
All contributions share the common goal to highlight how counterfactual 
thinking – i.e. thinking about something that never came to happen – can have 
very fruitful and worthwhile results in an everyday-life or in an academic 
context. At best, thinking counterfactually about the current state of the world, 
about a real or perceived feeling of instability and insecurity, might provide a 
first handle on the situation. 
